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LEGISLATIVE EXCLUSIONS OR EXEMPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE 
INSOLVENT ESTATE 
RG Evans* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A fundamental to the general policy in South African insolvency law is that the 
maximum quantity of assets must be recovered and included in the insolvent estate, 
to the advantage of the creditors. This means that all property that is owned by an 
insolvent at the date of sequestration, as well as all property which he acquires prior 
to his rehabilitation, forms part of the sequestrated estate.  There are, however, 
several exceptions to this rule and an asset that is the subject of such an exception 
may not form part of the insolvent estate.1 The Insolvency Act,2 however, does not 
expressly distinguish between excluded and exempt assets,3 so various problem 
areas have consequently arisen in this regard. Uncertainty concerning such assets 
has existed in the past and given rise to litigation, and will probably continue to do so 
in the future. The fundamental difference between excluded and exempt assets is 
that excluded assets, in the author's opinion, should never form part of an insolvent 
estate. They should be beyond the reach of the creditors of the insolvent estate. 
Exempt assets, however, initially form part of the insolvent estate, but in certain 
circumstances those assets, or a portion thereof, may be exempted from the estate 
for the benefit of the insolvent debtor.4 Both excluded assets and exempt assets 
could also carry that status because they may belong to a third party.5 It is therefore 
possible for an insolvent to build up a (new) solvent personal estate with these 
excluded or exempt assets, which cannot be applied to for the payment of his debts 
in his insolvent estate.6 
 
                                                 
 
* Roger G Evans, BLC LLB LLM LLD (University of Pretoria). Professor, Department of Mercantile 
Law (University of South Africa) evansrg@unisa.ac.za. Some aspects of this article are based on 
the author's LLD thesis. 
1 Bertelsman et al Mars 192. 
2 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
3 See, generally, Ferriell and Janger Understanding Bankruptcy; Bertelsman et al Mars 97, 239, 
415. 
4 See generally, Ferriell and Janger Understanding Bankruptcy. 
5 Mackenzie-Skene "Proposal for a Comparative Study". 
6 Miller v Janks 1944 TPD 127; Roestoff Kritiese Evaluasie 368; Bertelsman et al Mars 36; 186. 
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Although South African insolvency law is based on the policy of the collection of the 
maximum quantity of assets available, to the advantage of the creditors of the 
insolvent estate, a further policy, that of allowing a debtor to keep a part of his estate, 
has also been entrenched, originally through the common law.7 It would appear that 
originally the rationale behind this policy, as it developed through the common law, 
was to ensure that the insolvent and his family were not deprived of their dignity and 
basic life necessities.8 It is submitted that this remains the cornerstone upon which 
this policy rests, but that the requirements of modern society, socio-political 
developments in most societies, and human rights requirements have necessitated a 
broadening of the classes of assets that should be excluded or exempted from 
insolvent estates. To give but one example, the development of official pension 
funds, a relatively modern concept in law, necessitated legislating the exclusion of 
such funds from insolvent estates. In this article only property excluded from the 
insolvent estates of individual debtors by legislation other than the Insolvency Act 
and by the common law will be considered. It must, however, be understood that 
these legislative provisions relate to insolvent estates and thus generally overlap in 
one way or another with some provisions of the Insolvency Act.9 
 
2 Excluded property by means of other legislation and common law 
 
The following categories of property relate to assets that may in some way be 
connected to the insolvent estate, but in fact belong to third parties, or may be assets 
that accrue to the insolvent through social security-type legislation. These assets 
must be considered to be excluded assets because they are not the property of the 
insolvent debtor, or they are expressly excluded by legislation, and therefore cannot 
form part of the insolvent estate. The exclusion of these assets thus hinges on the 
policy that property belonging to others cannot form part of the insolvent estate,10 or 
that the assets are of a social security nature. These categories of property create 
                                                 
7 See chp 2 on Roman Law in Evans Critical Analysis 17; Ferriell and Janger Understanding 
Bankruptcy 97. 
8 Ferriell and Janger Understanding Bankruptcy 97 state that the fundamental reason for 
exemptions is the "belief that even the most hopelessly insolvent debtors should not be deprived 
of the basic necessities of life". 
9 For exemption provisions included in the Insolvency Act see Evans Critical Analysis chp 9. 
10 This policy is recognised in ss 23(1), 24 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the other legislation 
discussed in the paragraphs which follow. 
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some problem areas in insolvent estates, but the main concern here is to decide 
whether or not to continue the policy of excluding property of this nature, or a part 
thereof, from insolvent estates of individuals. 
 
2.1 Insurance payments in respect of third party 
 
If an insurer has an obligation to indemnify an insured person in respect of a liability 
incurred by the insured person towards a third party, such a third party is, on the 
sequestration of the estate of the insured, entitled to recover from the insurer the 
amount of the insured's liability towards the third party. This amount may not exceed 
the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify the 
insured.11 The indemnified amount is therefore excluded from the insured's insolvent 
estate and the third party can recover that amount directly from the insurer.12 
 
This provision places the third party in a preferred position vis-à-vis other concurrent 
creditors. In this respect it was stated in Woodlley v Guardian Assurance Co of SA 
Ltd that: 
 
... the claimant, instead of having to prefer his claim against the estate and be 
content with a dividend at such rate as the trustee (after recovering what is due to 
the estate by the insurer) is able to pay to unsecured creditors, is placed in a more 
favourable position. He can recover directly from the insurer. The amount which he 
can recover cannot exceed the limit fixed by the policy. But subject to that, he 
recovers in full, even if other unsecured creditors have to be content with a few 
cents in the rand.13 
 
This provision effectively excludes the insured's liability from the insolvent estate, 
treating this property as property that belongs to someone other than the insolvent 
debtor. It is submitted that this is a reasonable ground for excluding such property 
because the third party in question is not a creditor of the insolvent debtor and 
involuntarily enters the position he is in. 
                                                 
11 Section 156 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
12 Smith Law of Insolvency 96, Kunst et al Meskin 5.3.2.2; Bertelsman et al Mars 194. Where the 
insured is a company or a close corporation being wound up and unable to pay its debts, s 156 
also applies; s 66(1) Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 read with s 339 Companies Act 61 of 
1973. 
13 Woodley v Guardian Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1976 1 SA 758 (W) 759. See also Unitrans Freight 
(Pty) Ltd v Santam Ltd 2004 6 SA 21 (SCA); Przybylak v Santam Insurance Ltd 1992 1 SA 588 
(C) 601-602; Supermarket Leaseback (Elsburg) (Pty) Ltd v Santam Insurance Ltd 1991 1 SA 410 
(AD). 
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2.2 Trust funds 
The law is well established that trust property vests in the trustees of a trust,14 but 
the trust assets are excluded from the personal estate of an insolvent trustee of the 
trust in question.15 This exclusion is also based on the policy that the property of third 
parties does not form part of the insolvent estate.16 However, one must distinguish 
between the funds or assets held by an insolvent as a trustee in terms of a duly 
constituted trust and funds held as an agent on account of another person. An agent 
cannot change his status to that of a trustee through some unilateral act, because a 
trust inter vivos can be established only by contract.17 So if an agent holds money on 
behalf of another, it normally falls into the agent's insolvent estate. Consequently, 
legislative provisions are needed for the protection of money held by certain classes 
of persons on behalf of others. Some examples of such legislation, which will be 
discussed below, are the Attorneys Act18 and the Estate Agents Act.19 In these 
legislated cases, therefore, the legal position is clear. 
 
However, there was uncertainty on the position of trust assets falling outside these 
specific provisions. Honoré20 stated that a trust asset should fall outside the trustee's 
insolvent estate where the trust asset was identified as such. It must not have been 
mixed with the trustee's other assets. Section 11 of the Trust Property Control Act21 
requires identification of property as trust property. However, s 12 of this Act is not 
linked to such identification. Section 12 provides that: "Trust property shall not form 
part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as he as trust beneficiary is 
entitled to the trust property". So trust beneficiaries are apparently protected by s 12, 
irrespective of whether the property was identified in terms of s 11 or not. Honoré 
                                                 
14 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie's Estate 1961 3 SA 833 (A) 840G-H; Burnett v 
Kohlberg 1984 2 SA 137 (E) 141D-E; Bertelsman et al Mars 197. 
15 Section 12 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 which applies only to trusts created by means 
of a written document. See also Bertelsman et al Mars 196. 
16 See Wunsh 1986 SALJ 579 and Burnett v Kohlberg 1984 2 SA 137 (E) 141-142 for different 
views. 
17 Bertelsman et al Mars 197; Crooks v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A) 298G-H. 
18 Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. See Geyser v Fuhri 1980 1 SA 598 (N). 
19 Estate Agents Act 112 of 1976. See also s 4(5) Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 
of 2001; s 14 Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985; s 22 Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986; s 3 
Reinsurance of Damage and Losses Act 56 of 1989; ss 17A, 17B Financial Markets Control Act 
55 of 1989. 
20 Honoré Law of Trusts 14-15, 226, 432-444. 
21 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
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and Cameron22 seemed to accept this conclusion, but they doubted whether it also 
applied to immovable property. However, while s 12 protection should perhaps have 
been linked to s 11 identification compliance, the distinction between movable and 
immovable property in the application of s 12 seemed baseless. 
 
The Trust Property Control Act applies only to trusts created by a "trust instrument". 
A "trust instrument" is defined as "a written agreement or a testamentary writing or a 
court order according to which a trust was created".23 An oral trust, therefore, is 
apparently not included in s 12. So here uncertainty prevails if no legislative 
provision expressly governs a specific case. It would appear that such trust property 
may fall in the trustee's insolvent estate, unless it was transferred by way of 
registration and is registered in the name of the trustee in his capacity as trustee. In 
regard to movable property, the asset must not have been mixed with the trustee's 
personal property.24 If an oral trust agreement is reduced to writing afterwards, the 
trust will fall under the Trust Property Control Act.25 
 
2.3 Trust monies and trust property held by an attorney, notary or 
conveyancer 
 
In terms of the Attorneys Act26 every practising attorney, notary and conveyancer 
must open and keep a separate trust account at a bank in the Republic of South 
Africa and all monies held by him on behalf of another person must be deposited in 
such an account.27 Any amount standing to the credit of such an account or of any 
savings or other interest-bearing account to which trust monies have been deposited 
is excluded from forming part of the assets of the attorney, except for any excess in 
the account after payment of the claims of all persons whose monies were deposited 
in the account and of any claim by the fidelity guarantee fund.28 A curator bonis 
controls and administers any such account if one is appointed by the Master on 
application of the applicable Law Society or any person who has an interest in such 
                                                 
22 Honoré and Cameron Law of Trusts 558-565. 
23 Section 1 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
24 Ex Parte Milton 1959 3 SA 347 (R) 349-350; s 40 Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1956. 
25 Section 2 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
26 Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
27 Section 78(1) Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
28 Section 78(7) Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
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account.29 The rights of trust creditors of an attorney to recover in the ordinary way 
what is owing to them from the insolvent estate, namely by proving claims against it 
for the full amount, are not hampered by the provisions of this section of the 
Attorneys Act.30 Thus, the effect of this exclusion is:31 
 
... that there is a fund which is available for distribution amongst trust creditors but 
which does not form part of the insolvent estate, which is beyond the reach and 
control of the trustee and which accordingly is not available for distribution among 
the general body of creditors. 
 
Trust property registered in the name of any such practitioner, or jointly in his name 
and that of any person, in the capacity of administrator, trustee, curator or agent, is 
excluded from such a practitioner's or other person's assets.32  
 
2.4 Estate agent's trust account 
 
When an estate agent is sequestrated, the amount at the date of sequestration that 
is in credit in his trust account is excluded from his insolvent estate. Also excluded is 
any amount standing to the credit of any savings or other interest-bearing account 
into which trust monies have been deposited.33 
 
2.5 The right of a spouse to share in accrual of the other spouse's estate 
 
The Matrimonial Property Act34 provides that a marriage out of community of 
property by ante nuptial contract that excludes community of property and 
community of profit and loss, entered into since 1 November 1984 is subject to the 
accrual system referred to in Chapter I of the Matrimonial Property Act, unless the 
                                                 
29 Section 78(9)(a) Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
30 Fuhri v Geyser 1979 1 SA 747 (N). The existence of the trust account does not preclude a trust 
creditor from proving his claim against the insolvent estate of the attorney, but he may not 
recover from the estate any part of his claim which is paid to him by the curator bonis; see 
Geyser v Fuhri 1980 1 SA 598 (N) 601-602. 
31 Fuhri v Geyser 1979 1 SA 747 (N) 750; confirmed on appeal in Geyser v Fuhri 1980 1 SA 598 
(N); see also Ex Parte Law Society Transvaal: In re Hoppe and Visser 1987 2 SA 773 (T) 780. 
32 Section 79 Attorneys Act 53 of 1979; see also Bertelsman et al Mars 197; Smith Law of 
Insolvency 98; Kunst et al Meskin 5.3.4. 
33 Section 32(8) Estate Agents Act 112 of 1976. 
34 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
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accrual system has been expressly excluded by such a contract.35 The Matrimonial 
Property Act provides that, subject to any order of court under s 8 (1) thereof, "the 
right of a spouse to share ... in the accrual of the estate of the other spouse is during 
the subsistence of the marriage not transferable or liable to attachment, and does 
not form part of the insolvent estate of a spouse".36 
 
Thus, if the marriage is subject to the accrual system, the claim of a spouse to share 
in the accrual of the other spouse's estate arises and is acquired only on the date of 
the dissolution of the marriage and its value, if any, is determinable on that date. 
However, there appears to be a difference of opinion regarding the correct 
interpretation of s 3(2) of this Act. Meskin's opinion is that, giving the language used 
in the section its ordinary meaning, one cannot justify treating the words "during the 
subsistence of the marriage" as not qualifying also the words "and does not form part 
of the insolvent estate of a spouse". Thus, Meskin says: 
 
... the intention is that a spouse's "right to share in the accrual", which in fact is 
merely a spes (since it evolves into an enforceable right only on dissolution of the 
marriage) is to be excluded from such spouse's insolvent estate only during the 
subsistence of the marriage. The legislature recognises that there is no purpose in 
requiring administration in insolvency of a spes where it is uncertain not only when it 
will evolve into an enforceable right, but also whether, at the date it does, such right 
will have any value. 
 
Therefore, if a spouse's estate is sequestrated during the subsistence of the 
marriage, such a spouse's "right to share ... in the accrual of the estate of the other 
spouse" is excluded from the former's insolvent estate. Should the marriage, 
however, terminate during the period of sequestration, but prior to the rehabilitation 
of such an estate, s 20 of the Insolvency Act would become operative, and the 
resulting "claim" becomes part of such an estate and vests in the trustee of the 
estate of the insolvent spouse.37 
 
                                                 
35 Section 2 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
36 Section 3(2) Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
37 Section 20(1)(a) read with s 20(2)(b) Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Kunst et al Meskin 5.3.6; 
Bertelsman et al Mars 198. 
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2.6 Workmen's Compensation 
 
The Workmen's Compensation Act38 has been repealed by the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.39 This Act provides that "notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary in any other law contained, compensation shall not be 
capable of attachment or any form of execution under a judgment or order of a court 
of law".40 This clearly also refers to any form of attachment or execution brought 
about by insolvency legislation,41 so this form of compensation must be considered 
excluded property that never forms part of an insolvent estate. Compensation of this 
nature is either taxation-based or employer-based, so it may be argued that its 
exclusion is justified because creditors of the insolvent workman should not benefit 
from the proceeds of the general society. It is submitted that compensation of this 
nature is akin to a legislated welfare burden that is carried by the state or the 
employer and therefore indirectly by the citizens of the country. 
 
Smith is of the opinion that this form of compensation is excluded because it is 
considered compensation for personal injury under s 23(8) of the Insolvency Act.42 
However, it is submitted that this is strictly a legislative exclusion, while s 23(8) 
provides for other forms of personal injury that may not be specifically regulated or 
protected by legislation outside the Insolvency Act. But whatever the rationale behind 
legislation of this "welfare" nature, a policy-based decision must be taken whether or 
not to include all or only a portion of such compensation as part of an insolvent 
estate of the compensated workman. While it may be possible to include this 
compensation in the pool of assets that may be considered income of the insolvent 
person, thereby including it in a formula43 to collect income-type assets for possible 
distribution amongst his creditors, it is submitted that it will not be prudent to do so 
because of the possible nature of compensation of this kind. In respect of any 
compensation relating to personal injury, such compensation may be in the nature of 
payment towards future medical care over a lengthy period of time, such as 
                                                 
38 Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
39 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
40 S 32(1)(b) of Act 130 of 1993. 
41 Kunst et al Meskin 5.3.8. 
42 Smith Law of Insolvency 97. 
43 Evans Critical Analysis para 9.2.3, chp 12. 
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providing for artificial limbs or specific medication for the remainder of the victim's 
life. While compensation may, of course, also be of a monetary nature, this situation 
will lead to much uncertainty and probably litigation if such assets must be included 
in insolvent estates in certain circumstances only. By excluding such assets from 
insolvent estates entirely, the administration process in such estates will be 
simplified and the debate over whether or not "public funding" should be at the 
disposal of creditors is nipped in the bud. 
 
2.7 Unemployment insurance benefits 
 
Employee unemployment benefits are governed by the Unemployment Insurance 
Act.44 These benefits cannot be assigned or set off against debts and they cannot be 
attached by a court order other than for an order relating to maintenance of 
dependants.45 It would also appear that they will be excluded from the insolvent 
estate of the employee concerned.46 
 
It is submitted that the rationale behind this legislation is essentially the same as that 
discussed in the previous paragraph in respect of taxation or welfare-based assets. 
However, in this respect the benefits payable to the insolvent debtor will be akin to 
income and a policy decision will therefore have to be taken in deciding whether or 
not to pool this asset with all other income in accordance with the proposed 
formula.47 While very few debtors will probably be affected by this legislation, it is 
nonetheless important to formulate a policy in respect of this category of legislated 
property and the inclusion, exclusion or exemption thereof from the insolvent estate 
must be governed primarily by the Insolvency Act. 
 
                                                 
44 Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. 
45 Section 33 Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. 
46 Bertelsman et al Mars 193. 
47 Evans Critical Analysis para 9.2.3; chp 12. 
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2.8 Exclusions in terms of the Land and Agricultural Development Bank 
Act48 
 
Section 90 of the Insolvency Act confirms that the Land and Agricultural 
Development Bank Act49 (hereafter LADBA) grants the Land and Agricultural 
Development Bank (hereafter the Land Bank) certain rights to property in insolvent 
estates in respect of which it has an interest. 
 
The LADBA regulates certain actions that the Land Bank must take against its 
defaulting debtors.50 In certain circumstances, and through a prescribed court 
procedure, the Land Bank can attach and sell a defaulting debtor's property and 
thereby satisfy the debt owed to it by its debtor. This process circumvents the 
ordinary debt collection procedures.51 Further, even if property over which the Land 
Bank has an interest is vested in the trustee of an insolvent estate, the Land Bank 
can apply to court for an attachment order to sell that property. So the Land Bank 
may opt to act in terms of LADBA if it wishes to do so, thereby effectively, it is 
submitted, creating a category of excluded property after the property has vested in 
the insolvent estate, by "extracting" that property from the insolvent estate of its 
defaulting debtor. 
 
The LADBA also prevents the trustee of an insolvent estate from selling a debtor's 
property which is mortgaged by the Land Bank as security for its loan to the debtor, 
unless the Land Bank has granted written permission to sell the property, or if the 
bank has failed to sell the property within three months after notification from the 
trustee asking the bank to dispose of that property.52 
 
It would appear that the LADBA grants the Land Bank considerable powers in its 
position as a creditor in an insolvent estate. The Act effectively has the power to 
                                                 
48 Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002. This Act repealed and replaced the 
Land Bank Act 13 of 1944. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic see Kelly-Louw 2004a 
SA Merc LJ 211; Kelly-Louw 2004b SA Merc LJ 378; Kelly-Louw 2004 Speculum Juris 281; 
Kelly-Louw 2005 Speculum Juris 164. 
49 Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002. 
50 Section 33(2) Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002. 
51 Section 33(4) Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002. 
52 Section 33(11) Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002. 
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class property as included or excluded property of an insolvent estate. Depending on 
the moment at which the Land Bank decides to invoke its rights, it can also have an 
adverse effect on the other existing creditors of the insolvent estate by effectively 
depleting the insolvent estate of the debtor. This raises the question if there may be 
an extra duty on the trustee of the insolvent estate to assess the possibility of the 
Land Bank's altering the content of the insolvent estate, and thereby affecting the 
benefits of the other creditors. This negates the notion of a concursus creditorum. 
The actions of the Land Bank may also result in the possibility that the sequestration 
of the debtor may not be to the advantage of creditors, but this may become 
apparent only after the sequestration order has been granted, with the consequence 
that the golden rule of advantage to creditors and all encompassing policy has 
effectively been sidelined. 
 
One is further tempted to compare the rights of the Land Bank as a creditor in the 
insolvent estate with the rights of a child or other dependent person living in the 
home of the debtor whose estate has been sequestrated. In a sense a dependant 
can be compared to a creditor of the insolvent debtor. In fact, a parent has a legal 
duty to support his dependants. If the Land Bank can "extract" property from the 
insolvent estate, why can't a child extract "a right to a home" or a right to a sum of 
money from the insolvent estate of a parent? Are the rights of a child lesser rights 
than those of a creditor? This question has been considered elsewhere.53 
 
3 Assets acquired with monies received by the insolvent 
 
A consequence of the provisions mentioned above which provide for the exclusion or 
exemption of property from the insolvent estate is that it is possible for an insolvent 
to acquire an estate that he holds with a title adverse to the trustee of his insolvent 
estate.54 Thus, prior to his rehabilitation, an insolvent can acquire an estate separate 
from that of his insolvent estate55 which, in turn, can be sequestrated or 
surrendered.56 In this respect the following was said in Miller v Janks:57 
                                                 
53 Evans Critical Analysis chp 11, 12. 
54 Miller v Janks 1944 TPD 127. 
55 Ex Parte Fowler 1937 TPD 353 358; Marais v Marais 1923 WLD 37; Smith Law of Insolvency 
100. 
56 Ex Parte Foxcroft 1923 OPD 234. 
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... where an insolvent engages himself in an occupation for the support of himself 
and his dependants, he brings into existence a new proprietary entity which is an 
estate distinct from that already sequestrated; it is none the less an estate because 
at one time it has only assets, at another time only liabilities and at another time 
both assets and liabilities. 
 
This separate estate may, for example, be established by such specific provisions as 
those of the Long-term Insurance Act58 which protect, to a maximum of R50 000, 
assets acquired with the proceeds of certain policies. Also assets acquired by the 
insolvent with other monies protected by legislation will form part of the insolvent's 
separate estate and do not vest in the trustee of the insolvent estate. Smith points 
out that it would be absurd to allow the insolvent to retain, against his trustee, 
monies recoverable by him, but that he is precluded from purchasing land therewith 
or investing such monies in any other manner.59 
 
There is uncertainty regarding property purchased by the insolvent with his 
earnings.60 Until the Master has made an assessment regarding such part of the 
insolvent's earnings that are unnecessary for the support of the insolvent and his 
dependants, such earnings vest in the insolvent. If the Master does make an 
assessment, such assessed earnings then vest in the trustee.61 This issue brings 
one back to the policy that must be decided upon and formulated in respect of the 
idea of giving the debtor a fresh start when he is rehabilitated. Therefore, it is 
important to attain absolute clarity on a policy for exemption law so that the policy on 
rehabilitation will fall into place next to it and will consequently be functional as 
legislation. Once it has been decided what property must be included in the insolvent 
estate and what must be excluded or exempted from it, the content of the insolvent 
estate will be certain and the property included therein will be there for the benefit of 
the creditors. However, excluded and exempt property will belong to the debtor, and 
it is only logical that anything acquired by means of that property that does not 
belong to the insolvent estate must likewise be excluded from that estate. To hold 
                                                                                                                                                        
57 Miller v Janks 1944 TPD 127 132. 
58 Section 63 Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998. 
59 Smith Law of Insolvency 99. See also Bertelsman et al Mars 186, generally 192 and further. 
60 Smith Law of Insolvency 99; Bertelsman et al Mars 200 and further. 
61 Sections 23(5) and (9) Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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otherwise will be interfering with the rights of third parties who may have an interest 
in that separate new estate. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
From the discussion above it would appear that the strict and unbending policy on 
advantage to creditors will require some adjustment if a sensible policy on excluded 
and exempt property in insolvent estates is to be achieved. The provisions of the 
South African Law Commission Report62 (as it then was) made certain proposals in 
this respect, but it apparently will not entertain this idea of overhauling the aspect of 
exemption laws. In this respect Roestoff,63 citing some examples, says that: 
 
In die algemeen kan gekonstateer word dat die voorstelle van die regskommissie in 
verband met uitgeslote bates redelik konserwatief vanuit die oogpunt van die 
skuldenaar is en hom bloot in staat stel om 'n basiese minimum lewensstandaard te 
handhaaf.64 Die voorstel dat 'n voertuig as primêre middel van vervoer van die 
insolvente boedel uitgesluit word, is deur die meerderheid skuldeisers verwerp.65 
Verder is ook nie aan die moontlikheid om vir 'n uitsluiting met betrekking tot die 
woonhuis van die skuldenaar voorsiening te maak, oorweging geskenk nie. In die 
algemeen is die verslag van die regskommissie met betrekking tot uitgeslote bates 
myns insiens 'n weerspieëling van die pro-skuldeiser-benadering van die Suid- 
Afrikaanse gemeenskap. 
 
The South African Insolvency Act also provides for excluded and exempt property in 
insolvent estates.66 As shown in this article, this Act is supplemented by other 
legislation that also extends to insolvency law. Here insolvency legislation and other 
legislation therefore overlap. The South African system recognises various 
categories of excluded and exempt property also found in other jurisdictions, but the 
South African system, it is submitted, does not have a consistent policy on 
                                                 
62 South African Law Commission 2000 www.justice.gov.za. 
63 Roestoff Kritiese Evaluasie 370: "generally one can accept that the proposals of the [South 
African] Law Commission regarding exempt assets are viewed rather conservatively from the 
debtor's point of view, allowing him to maintain only a basic minimum standard of living. (Cf the 
Explanatory Memorandum at 61). The proposed exemption of a motor vehicle as a primary 
method of transport was rejected by the majority of creditors. (Cf the Explanatory Memorandum 
at 61 and further). Further, no consideration was given to a provision for the exclusion of a 
dwelling of the debtor. Generally, the report of the law commission regarding excluded assets is 
a reflection of the pro-creditor approach of the South African community (author's translation). 
64 South African Law Commission 2000 www.justice.gov.za (Cf Memorandum 61). 
65 South African Law Commission 2000 www.justice.gov.za (Cf Memorandum 61). 
66 See, eg, s 23 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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exemption law, and this has not been addressed by the authorities.67 The legislature 
and other stakeholders have failed to formulate a progressive exemption policy. The 
policy of advantage to creditors may be too unevenly balanced to favour the 
creditors. In practice, if advantage to creditors in an insolvency application is not 
shown, the sequestration order will not be granted. So "poor debtors" are at a 
disadvantage because they cannot shed their debt burden, nor in many cases have 
they access to excluded or exempt property, while debtors who have been 
sequestrated do have such access. A reconsideration of existing exemption law in 
both the Insolvency Act and overlapping legislation and fields of law will go a long 
way in clarifying many of the problem areas in respect of excluded and exempt 
property in insolvent estates. 
                                                 
67 Evans Critical Analysis chp 12 and the proposals in chp 13 thereof. 
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